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Abstract 
 
Inflation, as a tax on money, induces buyers to reduce their money balances. Sellers are aware of 
this, so to attract costumers, they post price offers that reduce the need for buyers to carry 
precautionary money balances. We study this effect of inflation in a competitive search 
environment where buyers experience preference shocks after they are matched with a seller. 
With full information, equilibrium price offers consist of a flat fee which is independent of the 
quantities purchased. With private information of buyers' preferences, equilibrium price offers are 
restricted by incentive compatibility constraints. As a result, the price schedule that maps 
quantities purchased onto payments must be increasing. As inflation rises, these price schedules 
become relatively flat, so the marginal cost of purchasing goods is low. Consequently, buyers that 
are not liquidity constrained (with a low desire to consume) purchase inefficiently large quantities. 
Meanwhile, buyers with a high desire to consume typically purchase inefficiently low quantities 
because, as their money balances fall, they become liquidity constrained. This is in contrast with 
the full information benchmark where inflation reduces the quantities purchased by all buyers. 
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1 Introduction
Many accounts stress that a commonly observed effect of high inflation is that individuals
end up buying goods that have little value for them while they are liquidity constrained when
they have a high desire to consume. For example, Willy Derkow, who was a student during
the time of the German hyperinflation, remembered in 1975:1 “As soon as you caught one
(bundle of notes) you made a dash for the nearest shop and bought anything... You very
often bought things you did not need.” With low inflation, this effect might not be so easily
noticeable to a casual observer, but it is potentially an important adverse effect of inflation.
In this paper, we advance a monetary search model where inflation reallocates goods from
individuals with high valuations of goods to individuals with low valuations.
In our model, goods are traded in a competitive search market where money plays an
essential role in facilitating transactions. This market combines trading frictions with an
efficient mechanism for determining the terms of trade. The existence of trading frictions,
such as lack of credit and private information, is needed not only to generate a role for
money, but also to generate the cost of inflation we seek to capture. The efficiency of the
mechanism for determining the terms of trade is desirable for our modeling purposes because
it avoids that the distortions we seek to model are the result of an inferior trade mechanism
between the private parties in a transaction.2
A key feature of our model is that buyers experience a preference shock after they have de-
cided the demand for money and are already matched with a seller. This timing is important
for our results. Firstly, it implies that buyers have an incentive to hold precautionary money
balances because they face uncertain expenditure needs. As buyers reduce their precau-
tionary balances to avoid the inflation tax, they are more likely to be liquidity constrained.
Secondly, each seller serves a potential clientele of buyers who have different preferences ex
post. This allows for the possibility of cross-subsidies across different buyer types. That is,
1See www.johndclare.net/Weimar hyperinflation.htm.
2As shown by Rocheteau and Wright (2005), with competitive search and full information the first best
is attained at the Friedman rule, while this is not the case with Nash bargaining or Walrasian pricing and
purely random search. See Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) for a seminal contribution on the search theoretic
foundations of money.
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the provision of inefficiently high quantities to buyers with low valuations and inefficiently
low quantities to buyers with high valuations is a possible equilibrium outcome.
The main insights gained from the model are the following. Inflation gives buyers an
incentive to reduce their money balances. Aware of this incentive, sellers try to attract
buyers by posting price offers that reduce the amount of precautionary money balances that
buyers need to carry. To this end, the posted price offers aim at reducing the variance of
payments and thus the need for such precautionary balances. With full information, the
equilibrium price offers consist of a flat fee which is independent of the quantity purchased
by a buyer. As a result, buyers optimally choose an amount of money equal to the flat fee,
so they avoid carrying any precautionary balances. With private information of preference
shocks, sellers are forced to charge payments that increase with the quantities served due
to incentive compatibility constraints. So a flat fee is not an equilibrium outcome. In this
case, equilibrium price offers consist of an increasing non-linear price schedule. As inflation
rises, price schedules become relatively flat as this reduces the variance of payments. With
these flat price schedules, buyers choose to purchase inefficiently high quantities as long as
they are not liquidity constrained (their desire to consume is low). Meanwhile, buyers with a
high desire to consume often purchase inefficiently low quantities because they face binding
liquidity constraints. Therefore, inflation reallocates output from buyers with a high desire to
consume to buyers with a low desire to do so. A positive opportunity cost of holding money
is crucial to this argument. If there is no opportunity cost to hold money balances, sellers
post price schedules that reflect the marginal cost of production, so under the Friedman rule
the first best is attained regardless of the privacy of information.3
The idea that inflation provides incentives to change trading arrangements in order to
avoid idle or precautionary money balances is also found in two recent papers. In Faig and
Huangfu (2004), inflation provides an incentive to market-makers to intermediate between
buyers and sellers with the objective of eliminating idle money balances. In Berentsen,
Camera, and Waller (2004), inflation provides a similar incentive to banks to do such inter-
mediation. In our model, there is no intermediation between buyers and sellers from any
3The first best efficiency under the Friedman rule is not a robust feature of the model. In general, the
revelation of private information creates welfare costs (see Faig and Jerez (2004)).
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third party. Instead, it is the pricing mechanism that adjusts in order to reduce the need for
idle money balances. Some of the consequences of inflation in our model are quite different
from the earlier papers. In particular, the relocation of output from individuals with high
valuations of output to individuals with low valuations is a novelty of our paper among this
literature.
One of the major contributions of the paper is to introduce private information in mon-
etary models with competitive search. To do so, we follow our treatment of private infor-
mation in Faig and Jerez (2004) where we study a competitive search model of commerce
in a non-monetary economy. The introduction of private information in either competitive
search models or monetary models is a natural development which is gaining momentum. For
example, Shimer and Wright (2004) recently advance a labor model of competitive search
with private information. Meanwhile, Berentsen and Rocheteau (2004) and Ennis (2005)
introduce private information in a monetary model, but without competitive search.
In a companion paper (Faig and Jerez, 2005), we argue that the precautionary demand
for money explains well the dynamics of the historical velocity of circulation of money in the
United States. The model in that paper simplifies the effect of inflation of the terms of trade,
which we study here, by assuming a different timing of the preference shocks. There, prefer-
ence shocks are realized after buyers decide their demand for money but prior to matching.
As a result, sellers are able to post price offers that target particular buyer types. In com-
petitive search equilibrium, buyers are then separated in different submarkets according to
their type, so the possibility of cross-subsidization emphasized here is eliminated.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3 solves for the individuals’ optimal financial decisions, including the demand for money.
Sections 4 and 5 characterize the competitive search equilibrium with full and private infor-
mation, respectively. Section 6 concludes. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Environment
There is a continuum of individuals with measure one who live in a large number of symmetric
villages. The members of each village are ex ante identical. They all produce a perishable
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good specific to their village and consume the goods produced in all villages except for their
own. Hence, individuals must trade outside their village to consume.
Time is a discrete, infinite sequence of days. Each morning, an individual must choose
to be either a buyer or a seller in the goods market that convenes later in the day. (One
may think, for example, that buyers and sellers must perform distinct preparatory tasks. A
similar choice is also present in Rocheteau and Wright, 2003, and Faig, 2004 with slightly
different motivations.) Each day some of the members of the village will be buyers and
others will be sellers. However, over time individuals will alternate between these two roles.
Individuals seek to maximize their expected lifetime utility:
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ε, qbt , qst ) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and
U(ε, qb, qs) = εU(qb)− C(qs) (2)
is the one-period utility function. This function depends on the quantity consumed qb if
the individual chooses to be a buyer, and on the quantity produced qs if he chooses to be
a seller. It also depends on an idiosyncratic preference shock ε which affects the utility of
consumption εU(qb), but does not affect the disutility of production C(qs). The preference
shock is uniformly distributed in the interval [1, ε¯], independent across time, and drawn
in such a way that the Law of Large Numbers holds across individuals. The cumulative
distribution function is then
F (ε) = ϕ (ε− 1) , (3)
where ϕ represents the constant density:4
ϕ =
1
ε¯− 1 . (4)
Both U and C are continuously differentiable and increasing. Also, U is strictly concave and
C is convex, with U(0) = C(0) = 0, and U ′(0) = ∞. Finally, there is a maximum quantity
qmax that the individual can produce each day which satisfies ε¯U(qmax) ≤ C(qmax).
4We assume a uniform distribution because it allows us to provide a simple characterization of a compet-
itive search equilibria with private information. However, our main results should hold with a more general
(non-degenerate) distribution function.
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Money is an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible, and storable asset. Units of money
are called dollars. The supply of money grows at a constant factor γ, so
M+1 = γM, (5)
where M is the quantity of money per individual.5 Each day new money is injected via a
lump-sum transfer τ common to all individuals:
τ = (γ − 1)M. (6)
We assume throughout the paper γ > β.
Each day goods are traded in a competitive search market, as in Moen (1997) and Shimer
(1996). Prior to the search process, each seller simultaneously posts an offer which specifies
the terms at which they commit to trade. Buyers then observe all the posted offers and direct
their search towards the sellers posting the most attractive offer. The set of sellers posting
the same offer and the set of buyers directing their search towards them form a submarket.
In each submarket buyers and sellers from different villages meet randomly. To focus on the
pricing issues we are interested in and avoid unnecessary complications, we assume a simple
matching technology. We assume that individuals experience at most one match each period
and that matching is efficient. That is, individuals can avoid matching with fellow villagers
and the short-side of the market is always served. As a result, the probability that a buyer
meets a suitable seller in a submarket is
pib (α) = min (1, α) , (7)
where α is the ratio of sellers over buyers in that submarket. Similarly, the probability that
a seller meets a suitable buyer is
pis (α) = min
(
1, α−1
)
. (8)
When a buyer and a seller meet in a submarket they trade according to the pre-specified
offer.
5For simplicity, the subscript t is omitted in most expressions of the paper, so, for example, M stands for
Mt and M+1 stands for Mt+1.
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In the competitive search market individuals are anonymous and enforcement is limited.
This implies that money is essential due to the absence a double coincidence of wants (gener-
ated by the ex-ante choice of trading roles). However, inside each village financial contracts
are enforceable. In particular, in each village there is a competitive credit market where a
one-period risk-free bond is traded and a competitive insurance market where individuals
can insure against their preference shocks. As it will become apparent, these two centralized
markets exhaust the gains from trade inside the village.
The village structure we adopt in this paper allows for a coherent coexistence of money
and financial assets. Moreover, the ability of individuals to rebalance their portfolio in their
village renders a tractable distribution of money balances. As discussed in Faig (2004), this
role is similar to the roles played by large households in Shi (1997) and centralized markets
for goods in Lagos and Wright (2005). We adopt the village structure because it proves the
most useful for our analysis.6
A typical day proceeds as follows (see Table 1). In the morning, centralized financial
markets are open in each village. During this time, financial contracts from the previous day
are settled. The government hands out monetary transfers that increase the money supply.
Individuals decide whether to be buyers or sellers. Then they adjust their holdings of bonds
and money, and purchase insurance if they wish. At noon financial markets close and the
goods market opens. As a result of the competitive search process submarkets are formed.
When a buyer and a seller meet in a submarket, the buyer experiences the preference shock ε
and the agents trade according to the pre-specified offer. As a result of trade, sellers produce,
buyers consume, and money changes hands from buyers to sellers.
Table 1
6With the village structure we avoid having the double decision layer of large representative households.
Moreover, we do not need the existence of goods traded in centralized markets and quasi-linear preferences.
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MORNING AFTERNOON
Financial markets are open Goods market is open
Previous Choice Choice Buyers Realization Trades
financial buyer-seller. of bonds, choose preference takes
claims Sellers post money, among shock place
settled offers insurance offers
Our equilibrium concept combines perfect competition in financial markets with compet-
itive search in the goods market. In equilibrium, individuals make optimal choices taking
as given the environment where they live. This environment includes a sequence of nominal
interest rates and insurance premia, and a sequence of conditions in the goods market to
be detailed below (essentially the reservation surpluses of other traders). Individuals also
have rational expectations about the future conditions of this environment. We focus on
symmetric and stationary equilibria where all individuals use identical strategies and real
allocations are constant over time.
To characterize an equilibrium, we proceed as follows. First, we describe the buyer-
seller occupational choice and the financial decisions of a representative individual given
some conjectures about the equilibrium nominal interest rates and insurance premia, as well
as the conditions in the goods market. Then we characterize the conditions in the goods
market in a competitive search equilibrium and show that they satisfy our former conjecture.
Finally, we check that the conjectured interest rate and insurance premia clear the financial
markets. A formal definition of an equilibrium is provided at the end of Section 4.
3 Buyer-Seller Choice and Financial Decisions
Consider an individual facing the following environment:
In the credit market, a one-period risk-free bond is traded. The nominal interest rate is:
i =
γ − β
β
. (9)
Since good prices are proportional to M, which grows at the factor γ, the real interest rate
is then equal to the subjective discount rate: β−1 − 1.
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In the insurance market, an individual that decides to be a buyer can purchase an insur-
ance contract which delivers a certain dollar amount µbε next day contingent on experiencing
a shock ε in the afternoon. The premium µ˜b of such a contract is actuarially fair:
µ˜b =
∫ ε
1
µbεdF (ε). (10)
While individuals potentially face a risk of meeting a trading partner or not, in our environ-
ment there is no need for insuring against such risks because they vanish in equilibrium (all
individuals trade with probability one).
We make the conjecture that the goods market has a unique active submarket in equilib-
rium where all individuals trade. Let α be the ratio of buyers over sellers in the submarket.
Also, let {qε, dε}ε∈[1,ε¯] be the terms of trade contingent of the realization of ε (the buyer’s
type) where qε denotes the quantity purchased and dε is the total payment in dollars of a
type–ε buyer. Since payments change over time as the money supply grows, the terms of
trade may also be described by {qε, zε}ε∈[1,ε¯] where
zε =
βdε
M+1
(11)
is the payment of a type–ε buyer measured in utils. In a stationary equilibrium the pairs
(qε, zε) are time invariant.
Prior to all financial choices, each morning the individual chooses the trading role that
yields maximal utility. The value function V of the individual at the beginning of a day
then obeys:
V
(
A
M
)
= max
{
V b
(
A
M
)
, V s
(
A
M
)}
; (12)
where A is the initial wealth in dollars, and V b and V s are the value functions conditional
on being a buyer or a seller during the day, respectively. The money supply is used to
deflate nominal quantities. This deflator is appropriate because nominal prices increase
proportionately with M (see (5) and (6)). The ratio A/M can be interpreted as initial real
wealth and is denoted by a.
While financial markets are open, the individual reallocates wealth and may also purchase
insurance. Conditional on being a buyer the individual chooses the demands for money and
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bonds, mb and bb, and the insurance contract,
{
µbε
}
ε∈[1,ε¯] , to solve:
V b (a) = max
mb,bb,{µbε}ε∈[1,ε¯]
∫ ε¯
1
{
pib (α)
[
εU (qε) + βV
(
abε+1
)]
+
[
1− pib (α)] βV (ab0+1)} dF (ε)
(13)
subject to
abε+1 =
mb + bb (1 + i) + µbε − µ˜b + τ − dε
M+1
, (14)
ab0+1 =
mb + bb (1 + i)− µ˜b + τ
M+1
, (15)
a =
mb + bb
M
, and (16)
mb ≥ dε for all ε ∈ [1, ε¯] . (17)
The buyer meets a seller with probability pib (α). Conditional on the realization of the
preference shock ε, the buyer purchases qε for dε dollars, so next period’s real wealth a
bε
+1 is
given by (14). If the buyer does not meet a seller, she buys nothing and next period’s real
wealth ab0+1 is given by (15). The choice of how to allocate wealth between money m
b and
bonds bb must satisfy the budget constraint (16). The buyer must also carry enough money
to face all contingent payments, so mb must satisfy (17).
Conditional on being a seller the individual chooses the demands for moneyms and bonds
bs to solve:
V s (a) = max
ms,bs
∫ ε¯
1
{
pis (α)
[
βV
(
asε+1
)− C (qε)]+ [1− pis (α)] βV (as0+1)} dF (ε) (18)
subject to
asε+1 =
ms + bs (1 + i) + τ + dε
M+1
, (19)
as0+1 =
ms + bs (1 + i) + τ
M+1
, (20)
a =
ms + bs
M
, and (21)
ms ≥ 0. (22)
The seller meets a buyer with probability pis (α) and, contingent on the buyer’s type, sells qε
for dε dollars. If the seller does not meet a buyer he sells nothing. Next period real wealth
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in each event is given by (19) and (20). The budget constraint (21) must be satisfied and
money cannot be negative, (22).
In addition to all constraints specified above, the individual faces an endogenous lower
bound on next period real wealth because he or she must be able to repay the amounts
borrowed with probability one without reliance to unbounded borrowing (No-Ponzi game
condition):
a+1 ≥ amin with probability one. (23)
Here a+1 denotes the stochastic real wealth next period, which depends on the occupational
choice, the realization of ε, and the outcome of the trading match. The endogenous lower
bound amin is equal to minus the present discounted value of the maximum guaranteed
income the individual can obtain as a seller.
The optimization program described in equations (12) to (23) is easily solved once the
value function V is known. The value function V is a well defined function of a that can
be characterized using standard recursive methods. The following result shows that V is
concave with a linear segment (see Appendix A for the proof).
Proposition 3.1 There is an interval [a, a] ⊂ [amin,∞) where the equilibrium value function
V takes the linear form
V (a) = v0 + a (24)
with v0 independent of a. Outside this interval, V is strictly concave and continuously dif-
ferentiable. Also, the interval [a, a] is absorbing, that is a ∈ [a, a] implies a+1 ∈ [a, a] with
probability one.
The linear segment of V is due to the endogenous choice of trading roles individuals
make each day. Intuitively, if an individual is not rich enough to afford being a buyer forever
and not so poor to have to be a seller every day, then the individual will alternate between
being the two trading roles. As the individual does so, wealth does not affect the quantities
consumed or produced, instead it affects how often and how early the individual consumes
or produces. Since utility is linear on the times and the timing an individual consumes and
produces, the value function is linear.
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The property that the interval [a, a] is absorbing simplifies the model dramatically. If all
individuals have initial wealth in the interval [a, a], as we assume from now on, the behavior
of buyers and sellers is independent from their wealth. As we show in the next section, this
implies that there is no incentive to create submarkets that cater to individuals of different
wealth. In this case, the distribution of money holdings is easily characterized.
The optimal demands for money are easily derived given that money earns not interest
but bonds earn i > 0. This implies that it is not optimal to carry money balances that are
never used. Therefore, mb is equal to the highest contingent payment: mb = max {dε}ε∈[1,ε¯]
and ms = 0. Using these optimal demands for money, (24), and a+1 ∈ [a, a] with probability
one, the value functions of the buyer (13) and the seller (18) simplify into:
V b (a) = Sb + β
(
v0 +
γ − 1
γ
)
+ a and (25)
V s (a) = Ss + β
(
v0 +
γ − 1
γ
)
+ a. (26)
These value functions differ only in the first term. This term represents the expected trading
surpluses of buyers and sellers in the afternoon goods market:
Sb ≡
∫ ε¯
1
pib (αε) [εU (qε)− zε] dF (ε)− im, and (27)
Ss ≡
∫ ε¯
1
pis (αε) [zε − C (qε)] dF (ε). (28)
In (27), m denotes real money balances in utils. Since buyers carry an amount of money
equal to the highest contingent payment, we have
m ≡ βmb/M+1 = max {zε}ε∈[1,ε¯] . (29)
Note that the insurance coverages are missing from (27). As long as a ∈ [a, a] the buyer is
indifferent between purchasing insurance or not. The only role played by insurance markets
is to ensure that wealth does not drift out of the interval [a, a]. This role is only important
if buyers purchase nothing for low realizations of ε. If buyers purchase positive amounts for
all realizations of ε then, in general, insurance markets are redundant. In this case, the
individual prevents a+1 from drifting below a by choosing to be a seller and prevents a+1
from drifting above a by choosing to be a buyer.7
7See the Appendix for the details.
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4 Competitive Search with Full Information
In this section we characterize a competitive search equilibrium in the goods market given
the individual optimal financial decisions. We show that in equilibrium the goods market
has the properties conjectured in Section 3. Moreover, the nominal interest rate in (9) and
insurance premia in (10) clear the financial markets. Then we characterize a symmetric
monetary stationary equilibrium where all individuals have initial wealth a ∈ [a, a] .
Prior to matching and while buyers can still rebalance the quantity of money they hold
sellers post their offers. An offer is a schedule {(qε, zε)}ε∈[1,ε¯], by means of which a seller
commits to sell qε units of output in exchange of a real payment zε in the event of being
matched with a buyer of type ε.8 All individuals have rational expectations regarding the
number of buyers that will be attracted by each offer, and thus about the relative proportion
of buyers and sellers in each submarket. The set of offers posted in equilibrium must be such
that sellers have no incentives to post deviating offers.
A submarket is characterized by an offer and a ratio of buyers over sellers,
[
α, {(qε, zε)}ε∈[1,ε¯]
]
.
Let Ω be the set of all submarkets that are formed in equilibrium. A competitive search
equilibrium is a set {Ω, S¯b, S¯s} such that
1. All buyers attain the same expected surplus S¯b.
2. All sellers attain the same expected surplus S¯s.
3. The expected surpluses of buyers and sellers are identical: S¯b = S¯s.
4. Each ω ∈ Ω solves the following program:
S¯b = max
[α,{(qε,zε)}ε∈[1,ε¯]]
∫ ε¯
1
{
pib (α) [εU (qε)− zε]
}
dF (ε)− im (30)
8We could allow for offers which are contingent both on the type ε and the wealth a of the buyer. However,
since the buyers’ expected surplus (27) and money balances (29) are independent of a, all buyers of a given
type ε are identical from the sellers’ view point. Hence, restricting to offers which are only contingent on ε
is without loss of generality.
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subject to
max {zε}ε∈[1,ε¯] = m, (31)∫ ε¯
1
{pis (α) [zε − C (qε)]} dF (ε) = S¯s, and (32)
α, qε ≥ 0 (33)
Conditions 1 to 3 are straightforward. Buyers are free to choose the submarket where
they trade and they have identical payoff functions (27) in the relevant interval of wealth,
so they must attain the same expected surplus. The same is true for sellers. Moreover, for
trade to occur in equilibrium there must be buyers and sellers present in that submarket,
so individuals must be indifferent between the two trading roles. Condition of equilibrium 4
results from a combination of optimal behavior and competition among sellers when they post
their price offers. In words, this condition says that buyers choose among submarkets in order
to maximize their expected surplus subject to their cash constraint and the constraint that
sellers receive a common expected surplus S¯s. (Individuals are infinitesimal in the market,
so they take as given the expected surplus of other individuals.) The cash constraint (31)
ensures that the buyer is able to pay for the good in all possible contingencies. Constraint
(32) is an arbitrage condition. If a seller tries to post an offer that attracts buyers and
yields a higher expected surplus, other sellers would profitably undercut this offer (e.g. by
offering those buyers the same quantity for a slightly lower payment). Sellers never post
deviating offers that imply a lower expected surplus because they can attain S¯s in the
current submarket.
The price offers solving (30) to (33) are not restricted to ensure that the trade surplus of
the buyer is always positive ex-post. Such ex-post rationality constraint would be natural
if buyers and sellers could not communicate prior to the realization of the preference shock.
However, we assume that buyers are able to commit to trade according to the offer posted
in the submarket they visit by making a down payment equal to min {zε}ε∈[1,ε¯] before ε is
realized. Such a commitment allows for the strong analytical results we report in the paper.
In its absence, the equations characterizing an equilibrium are easy to state (see Statement
19 in Appendix B) but difficult to analyze without relying on numerical methods.
A solution for program (30) to (33) must have the following two characteristics. Firstly,
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buyers and sellers must trade with probability one in any active submarket:
α = pib (α) = pis (α) = 1. (34)
Condition (34) is necessary for the total expected surplus from a match to be maximal
subject to the cash constraint. Secondly, the payments from the buyer to the seller must be
uniform:
zε = m for ε ∈ [1, ε¯] . (35)
To see this, notice that the sellers’ expected surplus (32) depends on the buyer’s average
payment, but it does not depend on higher moments of the distribution of {zε}ε∈[1,ε¯]. In
contrast, for a given average payment, a buyer prefers a smooth distribution of {zε}ε∈[1,ε¯] be-
cause the opportunity cost of holding money depends on the maximum payment. Therefore,
all solutions to (30) to (33) must satisfy (35).
Substituting (35) and (34) into (32) yields
m = S¯s +
∫ ε¯
1
C (qε) dF (ε). (36)
Using (35) to (36), program (30) to (33) simplifies into
S¯b = max
{qε}ε∈[1,ε¯]
∫ ε¯
1
[εU (qε)− (1 + i)C (qε)] dF (ε)− (1 + i) S¯s. (37)
The equilibrium quantities that solve this program are given by the following first order
condition:
εU ′ (qε) = (1 + i)C ′ (qε) for ε ∈ [1, ε¯] . (38)
With full information, the inflation tax (positive i) creates a proportional wedge (1 + i)
between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal cost of production in the
same fashion as in economies with a cash-in-advance constraint.
To complete the characterization of a competitive search equilibrium, it remains is to
determine S¯s. Since buyers and sellers attain the same expected surplus, (36) and (37)
imply:
m =
1
2 + i
∫ ε¯
1
[εU (qε) + C (qε)] dF (ε). (39)
We are ready to define an equilibrium of the monetary economy:
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A monetary stationary equilibrium is a vector of real numbers
(
i, α,m, S¯s
)
and a
set of real functions {(qε, zε)}ε∈[1,ε¯] that satisfy the system of equations: (9), (34), (35), (36),
(38), and (39).
This equilibrium is consistent with the environment conjectured in Section 3. In par-
ticular, since the solution to program (30) to (31) is unique, there is at most one active
submarket. The credit market clears because individuals have a perfectly elastic net de-
mand for bonds at the interest rate (9). The insurance market clears because insurance
premia are fair. These financial markets exhaust the gains for trading financial securities
inside the village because all individuals have identical marginal rates of substitution in their
margins of choice made in the morning.
We have shown that equilibrium offers minimize the opportunity cost of money balances
by having zε identical for all ε. Buyers optimally choose an amount of money m equal to the
uniform payment and spend all their cash. The welfare effects of inflation are captured by
equations (36), (38) and (39), together with the equation that determines the equilibrium
nominal interest rate (9). At the Friedman rule, i → 0, the quantities of output traded are
efficient. The convexity of C and concavity of U imply that qε is an increasing function of ε,
so high types purchase more output than low types. As inflation rises the opportunity cost
of holding money increases inducing buyers to reduce their money holdings. Sellers adjust
their offers by reducing their fees and the quantities handed to each buyer type. That is,
qε is a decreasing function of i for all ε. These reductions of output relative to the efficient
quantities represent the welfare cost of inflation in this model.
It is important to note that the equilibrium is only implementable if sellers can observe
the realization of the preference shocks. With a uniform payment high types receive more
output than low types and yet pay the same. Unless shocks are observed by the seller, buyers
have clear incentives to lie and claim they have the highest type ε¯. In the next section, we
characterize the equilibrium when preference shocks are private information.
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5 Competitive Search with Private Information
Consider the competitive search market described in the previous section, but with shocks
that are privately observed by the buyers that experience them.9 In this case, the offers
posted by sellers must be incentive compatible. That is, buyers must have no incentives to
lie about their type. Program (30) to (33) is then further restricted to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint:10
ε′ ∈ arg max
ε∈[1,ε¯]
[ε′U (qε)− zε] , for all ε′ ∈ [1, ε¯] (40)
As is standard, constraint (40) can be restated using the following well-known result. (See
Mas-Colell, Winston and Green, 1995, Proposition 23.D.2.)
Lemma 5.1 Let the indirect ex-post trade surplus of a type-ε buyer be defined as
vε ≡ εU (qε)− zε. (41)
A trading offer satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (40) if and only if qε is non-
decreasing in ε and vε satisfies
vε − v1 =
∫ ε
1
∂
∂x
[xU (qx)− zx] dx =
∫ ε
1
U (qx) dx, for all ε ∈ [1, ε¯]. (42)
Using Lemma 5.1, (34), and (41), the maximization program (30) to (33) with the re-
striction (40) can be restated as the following optimal control problem:
9If shocks are not observable in the village of origin insurance may not exists. This is irrelevant for the
characterization of an equilibrium as we define it because V is affine in the relevant segment. However, the
absence of insurance changes the values of a and a in (58) and so the set of parameter values for which an
equilibrium exists.
10Formally, an offer {(qε, zε)}ε∈[1,ε¯] is a direct revelation mechanism that is incentive compatible. While
direct revelation mechanisms can in principle be random, this is only optimal provided absolute risk aversion
decreases with ε (see Maskin and Riley (1984)). In our environment absolute risk aversion is independent of
ε, so random mechanisms are never used in equilibrium. We therefore restrict to deterministic mechanisms.
See, however, Shimer and Wright (2004) for a different environment with indivisibilities where random
mechanisms are optimal.
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S¯b = max
[m,{(qε,vε)}ε∈[1,ε¯]]
∫ ε¯
1
vεdF (ε)− im (43)
subject to ∫ ε¯
1
[εU (qε)− C (qε)− vε] dF (ε) = S¯s, (44)
εU (qε)− vε ≤ m for ε ∈ [1, ε¯] , (45)
v˙ε = U (qε) for ε ∈ [1, ε¯] , and (46)
qε is non-decreasing in ε, (47)
m, qε ≥ 0. (48)
The control variable of this problem is qε while vε is the state variable. Using the Maximum
Principle, the optimal path for the control variable qε must satisfy the following equation
(see the Appendix B for the derivation) : (ε− γ2)U ′ (qε) = γ1C ′ (qε) for ε ∈ [1, εˆ] , andqε = qεˆ ≡ qˆ for ε ∈ [εˆ, ε¯] ; (49)
where γ1, γ2, and εˆ are positive numbers given by:
γ1 =
1 + i
1 + 2i
, (50)
γ2 =
i
1 + 2i
, and (51)
γ1 +
γ2
ε¯
=
εˆ
ε¯
+
1
2
[
1−
(
εˆ
ε¯
)2]
. (52)
The variable εˆ represents the break-point shock where the cash constraint becomes binding.
Buyers with a realization of the preference shock lower than εˆ keep some cash balances
unspent. Buyers with shocks higher or equal to εˆ spend all their cash. Combining (50) to
(52), we obtain εˆ as an implicit function of i :
i
1 + 2i
ε¯
ϕ
=
(ε¯− εˆ)2
2
. (53)
This equation implies that εˆ is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate i. Intuitively,
as i increases, individuals reduce the amount of money balances they wish to carry, so the
probability of being liquidity constrained increases.
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The other unknowns of program (43) to (48) are determined as follows. The optimal
path for the state variable vε is implied by the differential equation (46) for a given initial
value v1. The optimal value of m is given by (45) with equality at the break-point εˆ. The
value v1 in equilibrium is determined by the condition S¯
s = S¯b. That is, v1 must be such
that ∫ ε¯
1
vεdF (ε)− im =
∫ ε¯
1
[εU (qε)− C (qε)− vε] dF (ε). (54)
Finally, the underlying payments {zε}ε∈[1,ε¯] are calculated from (41).
The formal definition of the equilibrium is now the following:
Amonetary stationary equilibrium is a vector of real numbers
(
i, γ1, γ2, εˆ, α,m, S¯
s, S¯b
)
and a set of real functions {(qε, vε)}ε∈[1,ε¯] that satisfy the system of equations: (9), (34), (43),
(44), (45) with equality at εˆ, (46), (49), (50), (51), (53), and (54).
With private information, equilibrium payments do not consist of a flat fee. Instead,
payments must be increasing with the quantity of output purchased to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints generated by private information. The derivative of the payment
z relative to the output q in a transaction can be calculated using the chain rule of differen-
tiation together with (41), (46), and (49). The resulting expression is:
dz
dq
= γ1C
′ (q) + γ2U ′ (q) for ε ∈ (1, εˆ) . (55)
Since both γ1 and γ2 are positive, the derivative (55) is positive. That is, the price schedule
that maps the quantities of output purchased with the corresponding payments is upward
sloping. Furthermore, using (49), (50), (51), we can calculate how the slope of this implicit
price schedule changes with the nominal interest rate:
d
di
dz
dq
=
1
1 + 2i
1− ε
ε− γ2C
′ (q) < 0 for ε ∈ (1, εˆ) (56)
As the nominal interest i increases, the cost of carrying idle money balances rises. Aware of
this, sellers have an incentive to post price offers that imply a lower variability of payments,
which is equivalent to a lower slope of the implicit price schedules that map quantities of
output with payments. Associated with this flatter price schedules, the quantities of output
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purchased a long as ε ∈ (1, εˆ) increase with the nominal interest rate i. This relationship
results from the application of the Implicit Function Theorem to the system of equations
(49) to (51) which yields:
dqε
di
=
ε− 1
(1 + i) (1 + 2i)
U ′ (qε)
γ1C ′′ (qε)− (ε− γ2)U ′′ (qε) > 0, for ε ∈ (1, εˆ] . (57)
Consequently, inflation not only curtails consumption due to lack of liquidity for those buyers
with a great desire to consume (ε > εˆ), but it also increases consumption for those buyers
with a low appetite for goods (ε < εˆ) .
As in the full information model, the inefficiencies described in the previous paragraph
arise only with positive nominal interest rates. If i→ 0 (Friedman Rule), the cash constraint
never binds: εˆ = ε¯. Also, γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 0, so the quantities traded are efficient because
they obey: U ′ (q) = C ′ (q) .
6 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that a precise modeling of private information in a monetary competitive
search environment brings interesting new insights about the effect of inflation. In particular,
it constructs a rigorous model where the primary effect of inflation is to obstruct role of the
price system in achieving a correct allocation of goods. In equilibrium, individuals sometimes
purchase goods for which they care little; while some other times, they lack the liquidity to
purchase the goods for which they care a lot. The intuition of this outcome is the following.
Inflation gives buyers an incentive to reduce their money balances. Sellers, aware of this
incentive, compete with one another by posting price offers that reduce the precautionary
money balances that buyers need to carry. With full information, sellers can do so by posting
an offer which consists of a single flat fee independent of the quantities served. With private
information of preference shocks, incentive compatibility constraints imply that the payments
buyers make must increase with the quantities they purchase, so price schedules must be
upward sloping. However, inflation makes these price schedules relatively flat. Consequently,
the marginal cost of purchasing goods falls with inflation, so individuals purchase inefficiently
large quantities of goods as long as they are not cash constrained. Therefore, inflation ends
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up shifting output from the cash constrained individuals with a high valuation for goods to
individuals with low valuations.
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Appendix A
Proof Proposition 3.1
Consider the problem of an individual in an equilibrium where all other individuals
have value functions (24). These other individuals have initial wealth in the interval [a, a] .
Throughout the appendix, we use without further proof the absence of uncertainty in trading
opportunities because of efficient matching.
For all finite a ≥ amin, the set of feasible time and state contingent policies is non empty.
The feasible values of the quantities consumed and produced are bounded. Also, for all
the feasible policies the present discounted utility is well defined and finite because U is a
continuous function. Consequently, we can use standard recursive methods to find the value
function.
In competitive search, we can recursively characterize the individual optimization prob-
lem as follows. (This characterization uses a more general definition of competitive search
than in Section 4 because it allows the individual to have wealth outside the interval [a, a] .)
The individual first chooses whether to be a buyer or a seller. As a seller, the individual
chooses
(
{qsε, zsε}ε∈[1,ε¯] ,ms, bs
)
, where {qsε, zsε}ε∈[1,ε¯] is the offer posted. As a buyer, the indi-
vidual chooses
({
qbε, z
b
ε, µ
b
ε
}
ε∈[1,ε¯] ,m
b, bb
)
, where
{
qbε, z
b
ε
}
ε∈[1,ε¯] is the offer in the submarket
where the buyer chooses to trade. These choices are subject to the constraints (14)-(17),
(19)-(22), and (23). Moreover, in the financial markets the individual takes as given the
rate of interest and the insurance premia. In the goods market, the individual takes as
given the reservation expected trade surpluses of other traders and has rational expectations
about their actions. Therefore, as a seller, the individual posts an offer which guarantees
buyers their reservation expected trade surplus:
∫ ε¯
1
[εU (qsε)− zsε ] dF (ε)− imax {zsε}ε∈[1,ε¯] ≥
S¯b. As a buyer, the individual acts as if he/she were choosing
{
qbε, z
b
ε
}
ε∈[1,ε¯] that satisfies∫ ε¯
1
[
zbε − C
(
qbε
)]
dF (ε) = S¯s, because competition among sellers implies that all posted offers
yield the same expected trade surplus S¯s to the sellers.
Let C(a) be the space of bonded and continuous functions f : [amin,∞)→ R, with the sup
norm. Use the Bellman’s equations (13) and (18) together with (12) to define the mapping
T of C(a) onto itself by substituting f for V in the right hand sides of (13) and (18) and
denoting as Tf(a) the left hand side of (12). The choice variables and constraints of these
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maximization programs are described in the previous paragraph. For a given a, the set of
feasible policies is non-empty, compact-valued, and continuous. The utility function U is a
bounded and continuous on the set of feasible policies, and 0 < β < 1. Therefore, Theorem
4.6 in Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989) implies that there is a unique fixed point to
the mapping T , which is the value function V.
Let V(a) be the set of functions f : [amin,∞) → R that satisfy (24) where v0, a, and a
are given by
v0 =
S¯s
1− β +
β
1− β
γ − 1
γ
,
a =
∫ ε¯
1
zεdF (ε) + im
1− β −
β
1− β
γ − 1
γ
, and (58)
a = −
∫ ε¯
1
zεdF (ε)
1− β −
β
1− β
γ − 1
γ
;
where i, m, S¯s, and zε satisfy the equilibrium system of equations described in 4. Consider
the mapping T defined in the previous paragraph. Since V is concave, it is an optimal
policy to fully insure preference shocks (full insurance is strictly optimal if there is a positive
probability that a+1 /∈ [a, a]). In consequence, a+1 is not stochastic. Let ab+1 be next period
real wealth for an optimal policy conditional on being a buyer. Similarly, let as+1 be the
optimal policy conditional on being a seller. If ab+1, a
s
+1 ∈ [a, a], TV (a) is the maximum
of V b(a) and V s (a) in equations (25) and (26), so TV (a) is affine and the trade surpluses
are those in (27) and (28). The optimal policies of the individual are the equilibrium ones
characterized in Section 4. Therefore, the individual is indifferent between being a buyer or
a seller. This indifference is broken when one policy would lead to a+1 /∈ [a, a] . In such a
case, the strict concavity of V outside the interval [a, a] implies that it is suboptimal to be
a seller if as+1 > a. Likewise, it is suboptimal to be a buyer if a
b
+1 < a. Consequently, the
recursive constraints (14) to (16) and (19) to (21), together with (58), imply that a+1 ∈ [a, a]
if an only if a ∈ [a, a]. This implies that TV (a) is affine in the interval [a, a] . Equation (26)
implies that the constant term of this affine function is the value of v0 in (58). If a > a, the
optimal policy is to be a buyer. Vice versa, if a < a, an optimal policy is to be a seller. In
both cases, the strict concavity of U and convexity of C imply the strict concavity of TV (a)
for a /∈ [a, a]. In summary, T maps V(a) onto itself. Therefore, the value function V satisfies
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(24). Finally, since V is concave, U is continuously differentiable and the solution is interior,
V is continuously differentiable.
Appendix B
Competitive Search Equilibrium with Private Information
In this section, we solve program (43) to (48) in two stages. Stage 1 (Statements 1 to
13) solves for the program for a given the Lagrange multiplier λ associated with constraint
(44), and given m and v1. Stage 2 (Statements 14 to 18) endogeneizes λ, m, and v1.
1. Suppose λ > 1/2 andm > −v1. The terms of trade in a competitive search equilibrium
with private information solve the following program:11
J(λ, v1,m) = max
{qε,vε}ε¯ε=1
∫ ε¯
1
{vε + λ [εU (qε)− C (qε)− vε]} dF (ε) (59)
subject to
v˙ε = U (qε) , (60)
zε ≡ εU (qε)− vε ≤ m, (61)
qε ≥ 0, (62)
v1 given. (63)
2. Program (59) to (63) is a standard optimal control problem where qε is the control
variable and vε is the state variable. A solution to the program exists because the
set of feasible paths is non-empty, bounded, and there exists a feasible path for which
the objective in (59) is finite. For example, the path qε = q1 for all ε and vε =
v1 + (ε − 1)U(q1), where q1 satisfies U1(q1) = v1, is feasible and with this path the
objective in (59) is finite.
3. Suppose there is an interval [a, b] ⊆ [1, ε¯] of values of ε where the inequality constraint
(62) is binding, that is qε = 0 for ε ∈ [a, b] . Then (60), (61), and U(0) = 0 imply that
in this interval zε is constant and equal to −va ≤ −v1. Since a ≤ ε¯ and m > −v1,
11The constraint (47) that guarantees that qε is a non-decreasing function of ε is omitted for the time
being because as we shall see it is not binding.
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constraint (61) is not binding in [a, b] . Therefore, constraints (61) and (62) never bind
simultaneously.
4. Suppose there is an interval [a, b] ⊆ [1, ε¯] of values of ε where the inequality constraint
(61) is binding, that is zε = m for ε ∈ [a, b] . Then Statement 3 implies that in this
interval qε > 0, so U(qε) > 0. Hence, (60) and (61) imply that qε is constant in the
interval [a, b].
5. Let$ε denote the co-state variable associated with (60), and ςε and ϑε be the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (61) and (62) respectively. The Hamiltonian of the program
(59) to (63) is:
H = vεϕ+ λ [εU (qε)− C (qε)− vε]ϕ+$εU (qε) + ςε [m− εU (qε) + vε] + ϑεqε. (64)
6. For the values of ε such that (61) is not binding, the Hamiltonian (64) is strictly
concave with respect to qε (for these values ςε = 0) and linear (and so concave) with
respect to vε. For the values of ε such that (61) is binding, qε is a constant (Statement
4). Therefore, the solution to the program (59) to (63) is unique, it is characterized by
the first order conditions that result from applying the Maximum Principle, and both
qε and vε are continuous functions of ε.
7. The first order condition with respect to the control variable qε is (Hqε = 0):
(λϕ− ςε) εU ′ (qε) +$εU ′ (qε) = λϕC ′ (qε)− ϑε. (65)
The co-state variable must obey (Hvε = −$˙ε):
$˙ε = (λ− 1)ϕ− ςε. (66)
Finally, the transversality condition implies:12
$ε¯ = 0. (67)
12The transversality condition is $ε¯vε¯ = 0. However, vε¯ > 0 if v1 > 0 given U(.) ≥ 0 and (60). If v1 = 0
still vε¯ > 0. If vε¯ = 0 then vε = 0 for all ε (as vε is non-decreasing). But this is impossible since the buyer’s
expected utility is strictly positive in equilibrium.
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Integrating (66) for an interval [ε, ε¯] and using (67), the value of the co-state variable
$ε is solved to obtain:
$ε = (λ− 1)ϕ (ε− ε¯) + Σε, (68)
where, to simplify the algebraic notation, we use the following definition:
Σε ≡
∫ ε¯
ε
ςudu. (69)
Using (68), the first order condition (65) is transformed into:
[(2λ− 1)ϕ− ςε] εU ′ (qε) = [(λ− 1)ϕε¯− Σε]U ′ (qε) + λϕC ′ (qε)− ϑε. (70)
8. Suppose there is an interval [a, b] ⊆ [1, ε¯] of values of ε where the two inequality
constraints (61) and (62) are not binding. Then the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem implies
ςε = ϑε = 0 for ε ∈ [a, b] , so the first order condition (70) simplifies into
(ε− γ2)U ′ (qε) = γ1C ′ (qε) for ε ∈ [a, b] , (71)
where
γ1 =
λ
2λ− 1 , and γ2 =
(λ− 1) ε¯− Σbϕ−1
2λ− 1 . (72)
Since both U ′ (qε) and C ′ (qε) are strictly positive for qε strictly positive and λ > 1/2,
(71) can only hold for ε > γ2. The Implicit Function Theorem applied to (71) implies
that qε is an increasing function of ε in the interval [a, b]. This property combined with
(60), (61) and U ′ (qε) ≥ 0 implies that zε is also increasing in the interval [a, b] .
9. Combining Statements 3, 4, 6, and 8, zε is a non-decreasing continuous function for
all ε ∈ [1, ε¯] . Therefore, either (61) is never binding, or it is binding in an interval of
high values of ε : [εˆ, ε¯] . In such an interval, Statement 4 implies that qε is positive and
constant: qε = qˆ for ε ∈ [εˆ, ε¯] .
10. Combining Statements 3, 6, 8, and 9, qε is a non-decreasing continuous function for
all ε ∈ [1, ε¯] . Therefore, either (62) is never binding, or it is binding in an interval of
low values of ε : [1, ε0].
26
11. Statements 7 to 10 imply the following characterization of the optimal path of the
control variable:
qε = 0 for ε ∈ [1, ε0) if ε0 > 1,
(ε− γ2)U ′ (qε) = γ1C ′ (qε) for ε ∈ [ε0, εˆ] , and (73)
qε = qˆ for ε ∈ [εˆ, ε¯] if εˆ < ε¯;
where
γ1 =
λ
2λ− 1 , and γ2 =
(λ− 1) ε¯− Σεˆϕ−1
2λ− 1 . (74)
The two real numbers ε0 and εˆ obey: 1 ≤ ε0 ≤ εˆ ≤ ε¯.
12. If εˆ = ε¯ (condition (61) is never binding), then Σεˆ = 0. If εˆ < ε¯, the first order
condition (70) can be simplified using (73) and (74) for εˆ, to obtain
ςεε = (2λ− 1)ϕ (ε− εˆ) + Σε − Σεˆ. (75)
Since ςε = −Σ˙ε, (75) is a differential equation. Its general solution is:
ςε =
1
2
(2λ− 1)ϕ+ K
ε2
, and (76)
Σε = Σεˆ − 1
2
(2λ− 1)ϕ (ε− 2εˆ) + K
ε
. (77)
The constant of integration K can be determined using the condition ςεˆ = 0, so
K = −1
2
(2λ− 1)ϕεˆ2. (78)
Also, the definition (69) implies Σε¯ = 0. Therefore,
Σεˆ =
ϕε¯
2
(2λ− 1)
[
1− 2 εˆ
ε¯
+
(
εˆ
ε¯
)2]
. (79)
Combining (79) and (74), we obtain:
γ1 +
γ2
ε¯
=
εˆ
ε¯
+
1
2
[
1−
(
εˆ
ε¯
)2]
. (80)
13. Conditional on ε0 and εˆ, the set of equations (73), (74), and (80) characterize the
optimal path of the control variable {qε}ε¯ε=1 . The optimal path {vε}ε¯ε=1 is obtained
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from (60) and (63). If interior, the optimal values of ε0 and εˆ are obtained combining
the interior first order condition (71) with the constraints (62) and (61) respectively.
If ε0 = 1 and/or εˆ = ε¯, the constraints (62) and (61) are satisfied together with the
associated Kuhn-Tucker complementary conditions.
14. The equilibrium values for λ, m, and v1 solve the following program:
max
{m,v1,λ}
J (λ,m, v1)− im (81)
subject to (44).
15. Since λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (44). The first order
interior conditions of program (81) can be written as follows:
i = Jm (λ,m, v1) , and (82)
Jv1 (λ,m, v1) = 0; (83)
together with the constraint (44).
16. Using the Envelope Theorem, (64), (69), and ϕ = (ε¯− 1)−1, conditions (82) and (83)
are transformed into:
i = Σεˆ (84)
1− λ+ Σεˆ = 0. (85)
Therefore,
λ = 1 + i. (86)
Conditions (84) and (86) combined with (72) and ϕ = (ε¯− 1)−1 imply
γ1 =
1 + i
1 + 2i
, and γ2 =
i
1 + 2i
. (87)
For i > 0, (84) implies Σεˆ > 0, so constraint (61) binds. Given γ1 and γ2, the value of
εˆ is obtained from (80).
17. Define q∗1 to be the solution to U
′ (q∗1) = C
′ (q∗1) . The assumptions about U and C
imply q∗1 > 0. Substituting (87) into (73) implies that qε ≥ q1 = q∗1 > 0. Therefore,
constraint (62) is never binding, that is ε0 = 1. Equation (84) also implies for all i > 0
that (61) binds, so εˆ < ε¯.
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18. In conclusion, the optimal path {qε}ε¯ε=1 is characterized by (73), (80), (87), and ε0 = 1.
For i sufficiently small, the optimal values of λ, m and v1 satisfy the assumptions made
at the head of Statement 1 because of the following reasons. Equation (86) implies
λ > 1/2. For i = 0, (84) implies Σεˆ = 0, so constraint (61) is never binding. Continuity
implies that for i sufficiently small m > z1 > −v1. In this case, the optimal value of
m is εˆU(qˆ) − vεˆ. Finally, the equilibrium value of v1 is determined by the condition
S¯s = S¯b, that is
∫ ε¯
1
vεdF (ε)− im =
∫ ε¯
1
[εU (qε)− C (qε)− vε] dF (ε).
19. In the baseline model, the value of λ in (86) is independent of S¯s in (44) because
utility is transferable (modifying v1) at the rate 1 to 1 + i. If the timing of shocks
is such that we must impose the ex-post individual rationality constraint: vε ≥ 0
for ε ∈ [1, ε¯], then transfers from buyers to sellers must be such that v1 ≥ 0. If this
constraint is not binding, the competitive search equilibrium is the one characterized
in previous statements because vε is non-decreasing with ε. If v1 ≥ 0 binds, (62) binds
for a subset of types, which prefer not to purchase anything and pay nothing, so ε0 > 1
and qε = zε = vε = 0 for [1, ε0). Equation (84) still holds, but (85) is now replaced by
1 − λ + Σεˆ ≤ 0, which yields the complementary condition for v1 ≥ 0 to be binding.
To find a solution, it is useful to combine the values of γ1 and γ2 in (72) with (84) to
obtain:
(1− γ1) ε¯− γ2
2γ1 − 1 =
i
ϕ
. (88)
Also, (73) implies ε0 = γ2. The optimal solution {qε}ε¯ε=1 is characterized by (73), (80)
and (88) together with v1 = 0, and ε0 = γ2.
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